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Belarus has not broken off its bonds with Moscow after the bre-
ak-up of the Soviet Union. Throughout the whole period of the Be-
larussian independence we can observe the countryÕs strong po-
litical, economic and military dependence on Russia. This depen-
dence allows Russia to control, and even shape, the processes
that take place in Belarus in all the areas mentioned. 
One can speak about the existence of one common space of se-
curity and defence, dominated by Russia. The functioning of the
Belarussian economy depends, to agreat extent, on the supply of
raw materials from Russia. Russia has ample possibilities to in-
fluence both internal political processes in Belarus and its fore-
ign policy. These strong ties between Belarus and Russia, as well
as the lasting Russian influence seen against hugely dispropor-
tionate potential of both states, makes one raise the following qu-
estion: to what extent is Belarus an independent country and to
what extent is it subordinate to Moscow?
T h e s e s
1. For Russia Belarus is an area of strategic significance, parti-
cularly for its geographical location in the direct vicinity of Poland,
a member of NATO, and of the Baltic States, which also aspire to
join the North Atlantic Alliance. And the shortest and the cheapest
through way for the Russian raw materials and products to the
West and to Kaliningrad leads via Belarus as well. For these re-
asons abasic goal of the Russian policy towards Belarus is to ke-
ep the country in the zone of its direct influence.
For Belarus a close cooperation with Russia is a precondition to
maintain its national stability. At the same time this cooperation
makes the country more and more dependent on its stronger
partner. Russia is able to control Belarus by means of exerting its
influence on the Belarussian politics, economy and defence. The
basis for such influence is aconsiderable dependence of Belarus
on Russia in all those areas and, to a lesser extent, the existence
of the Union State.
2. The fact that the rule of Lukashenka has been recognised by
Moscow as legal enables him, to a considerable extent, to func-
tion in the internal arena but also, although to a limited extent, on
the international scene. This situation allows Russia to exert its
influence on the decisions made by the Belarussian president.
This has become particularly visible during the period just before
the presidential election in Belarus. While trying to win the Rus-
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sian support, Lukashenka has been made to make numerous
economic concessions.
The cooperation with Moscow is a basic element of the Belarus-
sian foreign policy. The Russian patronage and neighbourhood
guarantee that the Belarussian president does not need to take
into account the opinion of the West, which comes out in support
of democracy and human rights in Belarus. 
3. The functioning of the Belarussian economy is, to a great
extent, dependent on Russia. Russia is the main trade partner of
Belarus. It exercises full control over the supply and transit of po-
wer engineering raw materials. Ever more Belarussian enterpri-
ses become formally and informally (the latter one happens mo-
re often) dependent on the Russian capital. The interest of the
Russian investors in the Belarussian market, which has risen du-
ring the election period, indicates that they count on economic
benefit in return for the political and financial support they have
lent to Alaxandr Lukashenka.
4. Because it wants to maintain its influence on the military situ-
ation in the westernmost territory of the Union State, Russia at-
taches great importance to military integration. For Belarus, on
the other hand, the ever closer co-operation with the Russian ar-
my, the Russian aid and guarantees are the only way to mainta-
in its military potential, although at the same time they deepen
the already strong dependence of the Belarussian defence sys-
tem on Moscow.
The Belarussian secret services, seen in the context of an in-
stitutional and staff-related continuity (the majority of its
members have previously been working in the Soviet servi-
ces), and also unlimited possibilities of obtaining informa-
tion by the Russian secret services, is in fact an instrument
of political control of Russia over Belarus. In principle the 
Belarussian secret services do not have any possibility to operate
without Russia knowing it, let alone to act against Russia. On the
other hand, Russia may conduct its operations in both Belarus 
itself and from its territory.
Integration process of Ru s s i a
and Belarus
Under Boris Yeltsin the MoscowÕsstrive to keep Belarus in the zo-
ne of its direct influence was reflected in the process of integra-
tion of the two countries. In 1996Ð1999 consecutive union struc-
tures were set up. The Belarus-Russia Community (02.04.1996),
the Belarus-Russia Union (02.04.1997), The Union State of Bela-
rus and Russia (08.12.1999). This process has enjoyed full sup-
port of the Belarussian authorities, who have more than once co-
me up with unification initiatives taking into account various
kinds of benefit following from the integration (for example aboli-
shing customs border between the countries). Belarus could also
count on financial aid from Russia (debt relief, non-repayable lo-
ans). Moreover, in the unification process Alaxandr Lukashenka
has seen an opportunity for him to come onto the Russian politi-
cal scene. 
On 8 December 1999 an agreement was signed on the founding of
the Union State which replaced the Belarus- Russia Union. It envi-
sages full unification of both countries in the future but it does not,
h o w e v e r, specify the rules according to which the integration sho-
uld follow. What is characteristic is the fact that the Constitution
of the Union State, which is presently in the making, does not de-
termine the division of competence among the union and the sta-
te bodies of Belarus and Russia. So far, none of the permanent
union bodies has been set up. The unionÕ s budget is fixed annual-
ly for a symbolic Ð given the needs Ð amount of 70m U S D. 
Under Boris Yeltsin presidency the crucial significance was atta-
ched to the propaganda dimension of the integration process used
by the presidents of both countries. In Vladimir Pu t i nÕ s attempt to
rationalise the relations with Belarus the ideological aspect of the
Union State has receded into the background. The unification rhe-
toric has been very much subdued. President Putin continues with
the process of unification to such an extent as it contributes to the
consolidation of Russian control over the political and economic
processes in Belarus, without entailing too high expenditure. The
integration initiatives taken up by Putin, so far devoid of real signi-
ficance, are supposed to ensure optimum conditions for the possi-
ble integration with Belarus. An example of such an initiative mi-
ght be the implementation of an agreement on common currency
of the Union State signed on 30 November 2000. It does not have
to lead to the real introduction of a common currency, neverthe-
less it does oblige Belarus to introduce changes in its monetary
and economic policy along the Russian line. For Belarus the con-
C E S  s t u d i e s
sent to a single centre of issuing the common currency, provided
for in the agreement, means giving up one of its attributes of na-
tional sovereignty to the advantage of Moscow. 
Striving all the time to consolidate its influence, Russia has be-
gun to limit the cost related to this process. Guided by its own in-
terest, Russia is currently withdrawing from those regulations
which make it suffer losses, it makes the weaker partner to ac-
cept what is not always abeneficial solution (Russia often expla-
ins its moves as following from the existence of the Union State,
by the way), it is less willing to sponsor the Belarussian econo-
my. Consequently, the Russian control has started to be a nuisan-
ce to Belarus and its leader. The necessity for a constant subor-
dination to Moscow weakens the position of Alaxandr Lukashen-
ka in the internal arena, and also makes him limit his political
ambitions related directly to Russia. After the takeover of power
in Kremlin the Union State that Lukashenka has supported is now
becoming a trap he might fall in.
The Union State is currently the political goal neither for
Minsk, nor for Moscow, it serves only as an instrument which
keeps Belarus dependent on Russia. The basic instruments
of Russian control over Belarus are numerous non-union re-
lated, formal and informal possibilities to influence the Be-
larussian politics, economy and defence.
The areas of dependencies 
and influence
The extent of Belarussian dependence on Russia and the mecha-
nisms governing it are visible in several intermingled areas:
a) internal policy
b) foreign policy
c) economy
d) defence and security.
a. internal policy
Owing to the fact that the Belarussian president attaches
great importance to the Russian support of his internal poli -
cy Russia has a constant possibility to influence his deci-
sions, which it willingly does. This has been particularly well vi-
sible during the period of presidential election in Belarus. For the
last couple of months one could witness this kind of election ga-
me going on between the Kremlin authorities and Lukashenka.
Russia was withholding its support for any of the candidates until
the very last moment. It seemed that lending support to the pre-
sident in office would be the best solution from the Russian point
of view, yet the signals coming from Moscow could have aroused
LukashenkaÕsanxiety. He was denied meeting President Putin se-
veral times. The Russian television kept presenting his oppo-
nents. The Russian papers regularly published articles on Mo-
scow losing patience with the activities of the current leader and
the necessity to introduce changes. This atmosphere of uncerta-
inty has been further fuelled by leaks coming from the Belarus-
sian secret services (their source has not been determined for
sure) on what is called death squadrons. It seems that once Rus-
sia has decided to support Lukashenka it wanted to gain as much
as possible. One of the more obvious concessions made by Luka-
shenka in that period was the fixing of export rates for oil and its
products on the Russian level. For Belarus this decision meant
a considerable reduction of profitable (but bringing annual loss of
70m USD to Russia1) re-export of the Russian raw material to
third markets. LukashenkaÕs consent to exempting Belarus from
the regulations of part II of the Tax Code, introduced by Russia in-
to the trade with the CIS countries, has been interpreted by obse-
rvers as a result of the striving for RussiaÕs favour. According to
the provisions of the Code, VAT is charged in the country of desti-
nation of an exported product, which would be a very favourable
solution to Belarus due to a high adverse balance of trade with
Russia2.
F i n a l l y, the Kremlin has chosen to support Luka s h e n ka in the elec-
tion. One of the signals of this support has been the payment of
the first tranche of credit allowed to Belarus a year before. This
success has had to be paid with further concessions. Every tran-
che of the promised credit, in total amount of 100m U S D, was to
be paid after Belarus had met certain specific conditions. One of
the conditions for the payment of the first tranche was, among
others, the consent to the establishing of a single centre for issu-
ing the future common currency of Belarus and Russia in Moscow. 
The Russian support has become one of the main trumps of Lu-
kashenka in the election. It entailed first of all the loyalty of the
nomenclature, the behaviour of which during the election the pre-
sident seemed to fear most. The significance attached to the sup-
port of Moscow may be confirmed by the fact that Lukashen-
kaÕs opponents were striving for it as well. 
Lukashenka, who has been boycotted by the Western countries
for the last two years, has proved that he is able to perform his
function without their recognition. His post-election speech has
been very characteristic, he has stated that the constitution of
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Belarus does not demand that any other country should accept
the results of the election, it is enough that the nation has accep-
ted them. Last yearÕs parliamentary election demonstrated that it
is enough that Russia recognised the results as democratic to
make them legally valid on the internal political scene. 
The Russian media, generally present all over the country, are al-
so an instrument of affecting the internal situation in Belarus. The
ORT and RTR television channels, available free of charge to the
receivers in Belarus, are here of particular importance. The pro-
grammes they offer are regarded as more credible than the pro-
paganda-saturated programme of the Belarussian television.
They are also watched much more willingly. According to NISEPI3
opinion poll from August 2001 the Russian ORT is the most popu-
lar TV channel among Belarussians, it enjoys the ratings of more
than 93%. The second place was taken by RTR channel, which is
watched by more than 80% of Belarussians4. The popularity of
the Russian channels is even more important in the context of the
fact that the Kremlin exercises constant and ever stronger control
over the contents of the programmes. 
The cultural vicinity of both countries has its influence on the Be-
larus-Russia relationship as well. The sense of a linguistic and
religious bond, a common history they share, and the nostalgia
for the Soviet times when Belarus was one of the best developed
republics Ð all these factors mean that the policy of integration
with Russia enjoys the support of the majority of the Belarussian
society.
In asurvey conducted by Nowak5 in April 2001 59.9% of Belarus-
sians were in favour of invigorating the unification process,
17.2% were against the integration of Belarus and Russia. In
a referendum 57.6% of the polled would vote in favour of combi-
ning Russia and Belarus in asingle state, 25.6% would vote aga-
inst such a solution6. The pro-Russian attitude is encouraged by
both official propaganda and the media, and by the Belarussian
Orthodox Church7, subordinate to the Moscow patriarchate. 
b. common foreign policy
Russia is the only partner of Belarus which matters in the world.
It has a clear influence on the Belarussian foreign policy and
plays a considerable part in defining the Minsk position in the in-
ternational arena. 
The foreign policy convergence is one of the best-implemented
guidelines of the Union State agreement at the moment. Consul-
tations among Foreign Ministers of both countries are held regu-
larly. On the international forum Belarus is practically of the sa-
me opinion as Russia on the majority of issues. 
The cooperation with Russia is abasic element of the Belarussian
foreign policy. It is difficult to imagine Belarus existing internatio-
nally without the support of its protector. Isolated by the West,
Belarus concentrates on the contacts with the CIS countries and
other countries for which the cooperation with Russia has a fun-
damental significance. Russia represents Belarus towards the
countries of the West, supports its striving to regain an observer
status in the Council of Europe and condemns all attempts of the
Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of Belarus.
Russia recognises the regime of Alaxandr Lukashenka and in this
way it is trying to legitimise his rule in the international arena. Its
patronage and neighbourhood are a guarantee that the Belarus-
sian president does not need to take into account the opinion of
the West, coming out in support of democracy and human rights
in Belarus. The attitude of the European countries and of the Uni-
ted States, appealing to Moscow for a democratisation of the ru-
le in Minsk, basically confirms the fact that in the Belarussian af-
fairs a deciding voice belongs to Russia8.
It is also possible that Russia often treats the cooperation with
Belarus as an instrument of conducting concurrent unofficial fo-
reign policy in specific areas. 
The convergence of the Vladimir Putin and Alaxandr Lukashen-
kaÕs calendar of travels to what is called rogue states, allows to
assume that foreign visits of both leaders have something in
common. In July the opposition Belarussian press, quoting Israeli
sources, accused Belarus, also on behalf of Russia, of arms trade
Ð with the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Palestine Liberation
Organisation, and with the embargoed countries, first of all with
Irak9. The Belarussian Foreign Ministry denied this information,
but many analysts consider it to be quite probable. 
c. economy
A strong dependence on Russia is also visible in the Belarussian
economy, particularly in trade and power engineering industry.
The dominating presence of the Russian capital in the Belarus-
sian market makes it easier for Russia to affect the situation in
Belarus. 
Russia has been, and still is the main trade partner of Belarus. In
2000 the trade exchange with Russia accounted for more than
58%10 of the total value of the Belarussian trade exchange (for
Russia it was only 6%11 of its foreign trade value). In the recent
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years we have seen a steady increase in the significance of the
Russian import, last year its share in the total value of the Bela-
russian import accounted for 65%12. Belarus imports from Russia
mainly power engineering raw materials Ð there is no alternative
source of supply, as a matter of fact. In 2000 Belarussian deficit
in trade with Russia amounted to 1.8 millionUSD. The constantly
high oil prices in the world markets have influenced the process
of leading to such high adverse balance. Before the rises in oil
prices the trade turnover between Belarus and Russia was prac-
tically balanced13 (see table p. 60).
A considerable part of the trade exchange takes places on the ba-
sis of barter, which also deepens the Belarussian dependence on
Russia. In 2000 Belarus settled 27% of the import from Russia in
commodities, which equalled 43%14 of the Belarussian output
export to Russia. Non-pecuniary transactions involve better qu-
ality goods, which could be sold at free market prices. The majo-
rity of the remaining output does not find purchasers and goes to
warehouses15. For some time now one can observe the process of
limiting barter and switching to settlements of accounts in cash,
initiated by Russia. Attempts to make the trade relations with
Russia more economical may lead to adecrease in attractiveness
of the Russian market to Belarus and they may become a stimu-
lus to seek new trade partners more actively. The year 2000 saw
an increase in the Belarussian export to other countries, particu-
larly to the markets of the closest neighbours Ð Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia and the Ukraine. The Russian share in the Belarussian
export diminished from 65% in 1998 to 51%16 in 2000. (see 
table p. 60).
The power engineering sector in Belarus relies in 88%17 on raw
materials imported from abroad. The Belarussian import of power
engineering raw materials is under total control of Russia. With
the annual gas consumption at the level of 16.2 billion m3 18 only
30 million m3 come from the Belarussian deposits19. 100% of gas
imported by Belarus comes from Russia. 
Russia keeps the gas price for Belarus at a very low level. For
2001 the price was fixed at 30 USD per 1000 m3 20, whereas for
the same gas the Ukraine pays Gazprom 80 USD per 1000 m3 21.
Despite this fact Belarus is not able to settle its dues as they 
come. In 2000 the Belarussian debt to Gazprom increased from
47 million USD at the beginning of the year to 244 million USD 
in October22. The way Gazprom operates is often convergent with
the Kremlin interests and this is often used by the Kremlin as
a tool in foreign policy. The enforcement of debt repayments, their
writing-off, or postponing in time become in this way another 
instrument by means of which Russia may exert its pressure 
on Belarus. 
The remaining branches of power engineering sector are also ve-
ry much dependent on the Russian raw materials. Belarus im-
ports 75% of the oil it consumes. Almost the whole of import co-
mes from Russia23.
An important potential trump card for Belarus in the contacts with
Russia is its transit location. Around 50%2 4 of oil and around
1 0 %2 5 of gas exported by Russia goes to the West via Belarus. The
existing transmission infrastructure would allow the transmission
of much larger quantities of these raw materials2 6. The dependen-
ce of Belarus on Russia in the field of raw materials weakens, ho-
w e v e r, the possibilities of taking advantage of its location. And so,
for example, in order to maintain a low price of the imported gas
Belarus charges Gazprom one third of the internationally accepted
transit rate for its transmission to the West. This amount due is
settled by Gazprom in part of the gas supplied2 7. When Gazprom
brought down the price of gas to Belarus from 30 USD per 1000 m3
to 26.9 USD in 2000, which according to official sources was to be
a direct benefit from the implementation of the agreement foun-
ding the Union State, some experts highlighted the fact that be-
cause the price reduction was related to an increase in transit
after the Yamal gas pipeline had started to operate, the gas beca-
me in fact more expensive if we take into account the proportion
of an increase in transit and the reduction in price. 
Russia controls also the whole Belarussian electric energy mar-
ket. It is true that Belarus generates about 75% of the energy it
needs itself, but it is always obtained through the process of co m-
bustion of the Russian gas and oil2 8. 85%2 9 of the missing energy
is imported from Russia and the remaining part Ð from Lithuania.
Due to an increasing debt, which amounted to 56 millionUSD for
the period 1998Ð99, Lithuania ceased its supplies. In May 2000
Lithuania, Belarus and Russia signed atrilateral agreement, pur-
suant to which Russia took over the Belarussian claims and it be-
came aguarantor of the Lithuanian energy supplies. In June 2000
Lithuania resumed the supplies to Belarus from a nuclear power
plant in Ignalina. In return, the Russian company Energia (Ener-
gy) supplies Lithuania with nuclear fuel. Belarus settles its dues
to Russia in commodities30.
More and more Belarussian enterprises become dependent on
the Russian capital31, mostly in an informal way. Recently there
have been much information in the Russian and the Belarussian
press on the intentions to privatise Ð with the share of foreign ca-
pital Ð several of the most important Belarussian enterprises,
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such as Naftan refinery and Polimir and Azot, chemical proces-
sing enterprises. There has also been much information about the
reported plans of Ruskiy Alumniniy (Russian Aluminium compa-
ny) to take over acontrol package in the Minsk Automobile Plant
MAZ, which satisfies 30% of the Russian market demand for lor-
ries32 and is one of the pillars of the Belarussian economy.
It is known that attempts are being made to take control over Be-
larussian enterprises within the framework of a debt settlement
scheme. The Russian gas suppliers Gazprom and Itera Ð the lar-
gest creditors of Belarus Ð seem to be the most active in this
field. In April 2000 Itera obtained shares in the Mohilou Chimvo-
lokno. It is trying to become a shareholder in the Novopolotsk
Naftan refinery.
For quite some time many enterprises have been in the area of
Russian interest. So far, however, Alaxandr Lukashenka has been
trying to maintain control over the most important enterprises
and he has deferred the decision on their privatisation. The inte-
rest of the Russian capital in these enterprises, enhanced in the
pre-election period, indicates that the Russian investors count on
economic benefit in return for the political and financial support
given to Alaxandr Lukashenka33. It seems that presently a game
is being played between Lukashenka, who wishes to maintain the
control over the largest number of enterprises which are impor-
tant for Belarus, and the Russian investors, who have the politi-
cal and economic means to take over this control. 
The next privatisation decisions taken by the Belarussian presi-
dent will show to whom he has had to make concessions and to
what extent. 
d. defence and security
The will to maintain its influence on the military situation in
the westernmost area of the Union State34 means that Russia
attaches great importance to military integration. For Bela-
rus the ever closer co-operation with the Russian army, the
aid and guarantees given by Russia are the only way to ma-
intain amilitary potential of its own, although at the same ti-
me they deepen the already strong dependence of the Bela-
russian defence system on Moscow. In the field of defence the
Russian involvement in Belarus manifests itself first of all in in-
vestments in the military infrastructure. One of the first invest-
ments of such kind has been the supply of equipment to the ba-
ses in Baranovichi, Vileyka and Vitebsk. The only unit of the Rus-
sian armed forces present in Belarus is stationed in the base of
the radiolocation station in Baranovichi35. For the last few years
the countries have concluded a series of agreements on military
cooperation, providing for the modernising of the Belarussian ar-
my according to the Russian model of reform. Also the prelimina-
ry drawn up defence doctrine of the Union State is practically
a repetition of aparallel Russian document and it provides for the
adaptation of Belarus to the standards of its stronger neighbour.
The Belarussian army is not able to function effectively when
separated from the structures and the material-technologi-
cal background of the Russian army. It does not conduct exer-
cises on its own above the tactical level. The first formally inde-
pendent action were the Neman-2001 manoeuvres (organised in
the eve of the presidential election, for political reasons first of
all, not for military ones), which in fact became a test of the
extent of integration of both armies. During the manoeuvres the
air forces and air defence forces were performing their tasks as
one kind of armed forces, the way it is in the Russian army. The
main headquarters of ground troops was developed along the sa-
me lines as it is in the Russian structures. Also for the first time
the manoeuvres were attended by the border protection forces
and railway troops, the KGB troops and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs forces, the participation of which had not been envisaged
by the Belarussian strategy of national defence, as opposed to
the Russian one. The speech made by Alaxandr Lukashenka after
he had visited the military training ground was symptomatic Ð he
declared with great content that the Belarussian army was fully
prepared to defend the Russian interests36.
In the context of an institutional and staff-related continuity
(the majority of its members have previously been working in
the Soviet services), and also unlimited possibilities to obta-
in information the Belarussian security sector is in fact an
instrument of political control of Russia over Belarus. The se-
curity structures of both countries are compatible. The structural
changes introduced by Belarus after the break-up of the Soviet
Union served to adapt to the new Russian standards. An example
of this kind of action was the establishing of the President Secu-
rity Service last year, which was modelled exactly on the Russian
solution. The Belarussian secret services do not in fact have
any possibility to operate without Russia knowing it, let alo-
ne to act against Russia. Russia, on the other hand, may con-
duct its operations in both Belarus itself and from its territo-
ry without any limitations.
This is possible owing to a number of Russian-Belarussian legal
regulations37 and multilateral agreements, concluded within the
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CIS framework, and also to a far-reaching informal influence on
the Belarussian secret services. The boss of the Belarussian KGB
is Leonid Yerin, a Russian, until 1995 the head of the FSB dele-
gacy in the Moscow district. The Belarussian services regularly
conduct common operations and have exercises with the Russian
FSB. Due to very limited possibilities of its own foreign intelligen-
ce, Belarus makes use of the help offered by the Russian intelli-
gence; similarly to other forces the Belarussian KGB uses the
Russian technological equipment. The heads of ministries hold
regular meetings, in the recent years even at the level of the Be-
larussian oblasti. One cannot underestimate the fact that officers
in both countries have very often developed close personal ties
among one another, the majority of them had graduated from the
same KGB school in Minsk during the Soviet Union era. Such
bonds are enhanced by frequently organised KGB and FSB per-
sonnel meetings, which have a social character. This is conduci-
ve to blurring the differences between them and it also preserves
the current system of full dependence on the Russian partner. In
every region, not only in the capitol, as it is the case in the rest of
the CIS countries, there are permanent representatives of the
Russian services. In practise this means that Russia and Belarus
constitute in fact acommon security area, characterised by ado-
minating Russian influence, presently reaching as far as the re-
gional level. 
The prospects for the Belarussian-
-Russian relations
For the next few years one should not expect the integration
of Belarus and Russia into one political organism, either wi-
thin the framework of the Union State, or along other principles
specified by Russia. Such process would be too expensive to Rus-
sia, in both political and economic aspect. This does not mean,
however, that certain elements of the integration policy, the pur-
pose of which is to consolidate the Russian control over Belarus,
shall not be implemented. In the near future the Belarussian pre-
sident will be subject to a pressure from Russia, which wants to
lead to some convenient changes in the Belarussian economic
system, first of all to privatisation of the national property with
the dominating share of the Russian capital. One can expect that
Alaxandr Lukashenka will try to defer these decisions in time,
aware as he is of the fact that depriving the country of its proper-
ty will mean the loss of his most important trump cards in the re-
lations with Russia. It seems, however, that at the end of the day
he will have to yield to the pressure. This will probably be due to
the fact that his pre-election agreements oblige him to make con-
cessions, but first of all because the unreformed Belarussian
economy needs investment and many factors do indicate that the
countryÕs internal financial means, also those budget-indepen-
dent resources like Ð what is called Ð presidential funds, are run-
ning low. Some kind of solution could emerge if Belarus opened
itself up to the Western investors and capital, particularly from
Germany, where for afew years now the investors have been put-
ting considerable hopes with the Belarussian market. It seems,
however, that due to the strong links of the Belarussian economy
to politics it would be exactly the Russian capital, which would
enjoy an advantageous position in relation to a possible privati-
sation process. The takeover of the most important Belarussian
enterprises by foreign investors would infringe upon one of the
pillars of LukashenkaÕs power exercising system Ð a direct con-
trol over the economy, which allows to implement a specific so-
cial policy. This would lead in the first place to adramatic growth
of unemployment, which so far has been maintained at an artifi-
cially low level, and this would also make the regulation of wages
from on-high impossible. In this context one may assume that all
this would result in adefinite intensification of an anti-presiden-
tial atmosphere. The position of Lukashenka would be additional-
ly weakened by the fact that according to the Belarussian consti-
tution the second term of office he has just started is his last one.
When deprived of social support the president would seek it in
Russia. One could suppose that the possible support lent by Rus-
sia to help Lukashenka remain in power would cost Belarus mo-
re political and economic concessions. 
There is some likelihood that Lukashenka will try to consolidate
his position38 by, among others, a certain hardening of his attitu-
de in the contacts with Russia. It does not mean, however, that
he will change his policy for a pro-Western one. The possible at-
tempts to improve the relationship with the West would serve to
legitimise his rule and to obtain financial aid. 
There is currently no significant political force in Belarus, which
would declare the will to loosen the bonds with Russia, even ve-
ry slightly. The opposition has been dominated by the pro-Russian
nomenclature, characterised by a rebellious attitude towards Lu-
kashenka. All the candidates to run for the presidential election,
apart from Zianon Pazniak, who is already on the margin of the
Belarussian politics, have declared their intention to deepen the
preferential relations with Russia. Many of them have visited Mo-
scow in the campaign time, seeking support. It is difficult to ima-
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gine that for the next few years the opposition circles should un-
dergo such a transformation which could give the forces striving
to make Belarus independent on Russia an advantageous posi-
tion, even more so that the pro-Russian option enjoys a strong
social support.
The shape of the Belarussian political scene and many other
strong political, economic and military dependencies joining Be-
larus with Russia allow to presume that regardless of the possi-
ble changes in the internal policy the Russian influence in Bela-
rus will consolidate and expand. 
Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga
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Import
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1998
15.6
7.0
8.5
-1.5
9.3
4.6
4.7
-0.06
1.4
0.6
0.8
-0.2
4.9
1.9
3.0
-1.1
1999
12.6
5.9
6.7
-0.7
7.0
3.2
3.8
-0.5
0.9
0.4
0.5
-0.1
4.7
2.3
2.4
-0.1
2000
15.8
7.3
8,5
-1.1
9.3
3.8
5.5
-1.8
1.1
0.6
0.5
0.1
5.4
2.9
2.5
0.4
Geographical structure of the Belarussian trade exchange (data in billions USD)
Calculations made by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the Republic of Belarus
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